Committee stage in the Commons
The Sixth sitting concluded the committee's scrutiny of the children's social care provider oversight clauses (Clauses 11–17) and then moved through agency workers, ill treatment of 16–17-year-olds, and child employment, with Conservative and Lib Dem members pressing hard on the enforceability of profit caps and the adequacy of workforce supply.
TMopened the debateThe Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Education (Stephen Morgan)Lab14:00 HansardThe term "reasonably suspects" in the provider-group oversight powers gives Ofsted the right trigger point — the same bar that already applies to individual settings. If two or more settings in a group fall short, Ofsted can require group-level action; where there is a single-setting problem, existing registration powers apply. The Hesley Group case showed exactly why we need this: a culture of silence across a provider group could not be addressed with any legal backing before. We are investing over £130 million in fostering hubs and kinship care and more than £36 million specifically on foster-carer recruitment and retention. On impact assessments: the Regulatory Policy Committee is reviewing them and we will publish shortly, including child's rights impact assessments.As I said in the last sitting, I am grateful to the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston, for his thoughtful contributions and specific questions. I will take those points away and I will try to address as many of them as I can in this debate. As required, we have produced impact assessments for all measures in the Bill, and have followed the better regulation framework for measures that are in its scope. As outlined on gov.uk, the Regulatory Policy Committee, or RPC, is currently reviewing the Bill’s impact assessments and will produce an opinion when its scrutiny has been completed. We will publish those impact assessments shortly. We have also conducted child’s rights impact assessments, where children are directly impacted by the policies and/or there are particular groups of children and young people who are more likely to be affected than others, as I mentioned this morning. There is no requirement to publish these documents in relation to England, but the documents are currently under review, and we will also publish those shortly. The shadow Minister made a number of points about the shortage of foster carers. Local authorities have a duty to place looked-after children in their care in registered children’s homes. We understand that sometimes authorities need to place a child quickly, including when there are no suitable registered places immediately available, but the Government are clear that all providers of accommodation for children should register with Ofsted. We are also helping local authorities to meet their sufficiency duty by investing more than £130 million in fostering hubs and kinship care and providing additional funding for children’s homes, including more than £36 million specifically on foster carer recruitment and retention. In the light of the questions that the shadow Minister raised, I also wanted to respond on how we are working with Ofsted to embed the reforms in the Bill. As Sir Martyn set out i…
On proposed new section 30ZC(3)(a) of the Care Standards Act 2000: does the bar on regulatory fines apply because of the circumstances of the individual case, or does it apply permanently to anyone who has a previous conviction? Please either clarify now or undertake to write.I simply want to lodge a very specific question about proposed new section 30ZC(3)(a) of the Care Standards Act 2000 and the category of people who may not be given a regulatory fine but instead must be prosecuted. I raised the issue in this morning’s session about whether those people would not be able to get a regulatory fine because of the individual case being dealt with, or whether it was the case that anybody who had a previous history of being found guilty of any of these things could not have a regulatory fine applied to them. I would be grateful if the Minister can clear that up now, or if he will undertake to write to me about it. It is just to understand what the law is proposing in that respect.
- Clause 13 hands the Secretary of State sweeping new powers over financial oversight conditions, but almost all the detail is left to regulations. The Opposition are broadly sympathetic — a provider suddenly collapsing and displacing children overnight is exactly what we are trying to prevent — but a few things need clarifying. Why does the independent business review power not extend to scrutinising the recovery and resolution plan? Is it an oversight in the drafting? The policy summary says registration can be refused to someone whose parent undertaking has failed the financial oversight scheme — where exactly does that sit in the Bill? And given the complexity of private equity debt structures, does Ofsted or the Department actually have the forensic financial expertise to assess these plans? We would welcome a requirement that all new market entrants provide full financial transparency up to parent-company level, with quarterly going-concern updates, as a condition of registration — rather than waiting for a whistleblower.
It is actually quite difficult to talk to clause 13, as it looks as though pretty much all the important detail here is to be worked out in regulations. Of course, the Government should support local authorities to minimise the risk of disruption to children in homes or independent fostering placements from providers getting into financial difficulty, and financial oversight should indeed be part of their registration conditions. So far, so good. However, proposed new section 30ZE(2) of the Care Standards Act 2000 states that a financial oversight condition “is a condition specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State for the purposes of this section.” Subsection (4) lists examples such as size, the number of children looked after, geographical concentration and so on. Though this area is being left to regulations, could the Minister say more about the sort of thresholds the Government are considering for these metrics—particularly as the Secretary of State will have so much power, including to alter all the criteria in regulations? Although this is broadly a sensible measure, it is quite an open-ended and new power. The clause is already quite long, but the Opposition wondered about an improvement, perhaps as it goes through the other place, to fundamentally change the registration approach for any new market entrants, so that it is a condition of delivery that they provide financial transparency up to the parent company level, give a quarterly going concern update to the regulator and provide financial information as reasonably requested by the regulator. Has the Department considered similar requirements, so that all providers would have to give full financial transparency as a matter of course and further investigation would follow if concerns were raised? We are completely sympathetic to proportionality in regulation, but in this case we could reasonably put the onus on providers to share the information systematically, rather than having to wait for…
Clause 13 is particularly vital for large-scale providers, because the sheer number of children who would lose their homes overnight if one failed is enormous. No young person should face losing their placement without warning. This follows the Competition and Markets Authority's recommendation to replicate the equivalent financial oversight scheme already in place in adult social care — long overdue in children's.We heard from the right hon. Member for East Hampshire about the involvement of larger and smaller-scale providers in children’s social care, and the Bill covers the other places that children and young people can make their home in. I think we all agree that there is a need for a wide range of options, so that we can determine what is best for individual children and young people when they are finding their home. Clause 13, however, is particularly relevant to larger-scale providers because of the sheer number of children who would be affected should one of those providers experience unexpected or unreported financial difficulties. No young person should be faced with losing their house overnight, and this measure would help to secure provision for those children in a planned way, as opposed to a reactive situation where a number of places have to be found overnight. The clause also follows the Competition and Markets Authority’s recommendation to emulate the equivalent schemes we find in adult social care. That is long overdue in child social care. It adds safeguards that allow for transparency and security, which we welcome when we are dealing with children’s social care and the homes that they will hopefully have for a long time.
- The new financial oversight scheme will, for the first time, give local authorities advance warning of a major provider's potential failure so they can plan alternative placements before a crisis hits. Providers in scope — private, voluntary and charity children's homes, dual-registered special schools, and independent fostering agencies — will submit recovery and resolution plans and, if at heightened risk, undergo an independent business review. The scheme will be proportionate: it targets only difficult-to-replace providers, assessed by size, market share and geographical concentration. On the shadow Minister's question about the drafting gap: the independent business review power is intentionally separate from the RRP scrutiny — Ofsted leads on quality while the Department leads on financial analysis. The level of detail, including thresholds, will be set out in regulations after consultation with local authorities and provider representatives.
We are aware that a provider of children’s social care places suddenly closing their provision as a result of financial failure could have a significant detrimental impact on the care and stability of children and young people where they live. Currently, local authorities have no way of knowing whether a private provider or its corporate owners are at risk of failing financially. If a large provider were to fail and suddenly exit the market without warning, it could be difficult for local authorities to find alternative placements for those children or places that appropriately meet their needs. That is why we are developing a new financial oversight scheme in children’s social care, as recommended by the Competition and Markets Authority, which will for the first time increase the financial and corporate transparency of difficult-to-replace children’s social care providers and allow accurate real-time assessment of financial risk. The scheme will give local authorities advance warning of failure, so that they can take swift action and minimise disruption to the most vulnerable children. Those in the scheme will be required to submit a recovery and resolution plan containing information on risks to providers’ financial sustainability and plans to reduce those risks. The Secretary of State may also require providers or a corporate group member in the scheme of heightened financial risk to undergo an independent business review. We will provide details of the RRP and the IBR through guidance. I thank the shadow Minister for his comments and questions and my good and hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North for her insightful contribution. The shadow Minister asked a number of questions about how the scheme will work in practice ahead of the regulations, and made a number of points about which providers will be in scope of the financial oversight scheme. It is worth saying that the scheme will be proportionate and target only difficult-to-replace providers and their…
I move Amendment 42, which would extend the profit-cap power in Clause 14 to independent special schools with caring responsibilities and SEND provision.I beg to move amendment 42, in clause 14, page 28, line 37, at end insert— “(c) independent schools with caring responsibilities and offering SEND provision.” This amendment would include independent special schools within the profit cap provision.
- I support a mixed economy in public services — but there must be limits when the market is broken. A placement in a children's care home now costs, on average, £5,500 a week, and that is crippling local authority finances. The CMA's 2022 report said the UK had "sleepwalked into a dysfunctional market" with the largest private providers charging materially higher prices than a functioning market would sustain. Clause 14 is the right backstop, but profit caps are hard to enforce against providers with deep pockets and complex multi-jurisdictional structures. More importantly, why are independent special schools excluded? In 2021-22, councils spent £1.3 billion on independent and non-maintained special schools — twice the figure from six years earlier, at an average of £56,710 per place. LaingBuisson data shows over a third of the 23 major providers have EBITDA margins above 20%, driven mainly by private equity. Many of those same companies run the children's homes Clause 14 already covers. The Government should extend the power — Amendment 42 does exactly that.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Betts. Clause 14 grants the Secretary of State the power to limit the profits of certain social care providers, so I will say at the outset that I, as a Liberal, support a mixed economy in the provision of public services, but I believe that there must be limits to that. It is clear that we have a market that is not functioning, and there are providers who are shamelessly profiteering. I spoke to my director of children’s services about this last week, and he told me at the moment the average price of a placement in a children’s care home per week is £5,500. That is very much the average price; a number charge multiple times that amount per week. That local authority finances are being utterly crippled by some providers, which are clearly behaving inappropriately in the market because of the lack of supply, leaves me incredulous. A number of hon. Members have made reference to the Competition and Markets Authority’s 2022 report. It said that the UK had sleepwalked into a dysfunctional market, and that “the largest private providers…are…charging materially higher prices, than we would expect if this market were functioning effectively”. The power in clause 14 is an important backstop if other measures are not successful, but the devil will be in the detail of how the power is implemented if it is triggered. We all know that many of those big companies have deep pockets from which to pay the best accountants and lawyers, and comprise multiple companies in complex structures all over the world; they can put money into all sorts of different places to avoid the intended scrutiny. Amendment 41 would include independent special schools in the provision. I will say at the outset that there are many independent special schools run by private providers and voluntary sector providers that do an excellent job and are certainly not profiteering; none the less, some do not fall into that category. We are all acutely aware of…
- Amendment 25 keeps the focus firmly on supply and capacity — the CMA itself didn't recommend a profit cap in 2022 because, in its words, "the central problem facing the market is the lack of sufficient capacity," and warned that limiting profitability would "risk increasing the capacity shortfall." Josh MacAlister's independent review reached the same conclusion: it would be "relatively easy for providers to reallocate income and expenditure to maintain profit levels." So if we cap profits without fixing supply first, we risk driving prices up and making the shortage worse. The Opposition welcome the clause as a genuine last resort, and won't vote against it, but we want a national assessment of available placements published before the power is triggered — that is what Amendment 25 requires. Without that data, neither Parliament nor local authorities can properly judge whether a cap is warranted. On enforcement: the Home Office can't even tell us what proportion of illegal-working fines are actually paid. If we introduce this retrospective clawback mechanism, Ministers must build an iron-clad collection mechanism, otherwise providers will simply fold the entity and re-register. Ministers should also consider whether to take powers now to discourage commissioning from offshore-domiciled providers.
I rise to speak to amendment 25 and clause 14. I thank the hon. Member for Twickenham for what she said about our amendment. I completely agree that, ideally, we would have what we are asking for on a regular basis, but just to be clear, the requirement on the Secretary of State to report to Parliament details and analysis of available placements is in amendment 25 because we want to keep the focus firmly on supply and capacity, which I think we agree are the ultimate drivers of the problem we are addressing. As we said in response to the oral statement to the House by the Secretary of State, we welcome the continuing focus on issues that we identified, and we set up the market intervention advisory group to look at that when we were in government. The heart of the problem, however, as I think we all recognise, is the lack of supply of high-quality places in residential, kinship and foster care for looked-after children. Demand for such places outstrips supply, and that is what is causing the high cost of placements. It is striking that in its 2022 report, the Competition and Markets Authority did not recommend a profit cap because, in its words, “The central problem facing the market…is the lack of sufficient capacity.” The CMA concluded that taking measures to limit the profitability of providers would “risk increasing the capacity shortfall.” So if we do not take action to increase capacity first, ironically, we risk simply driving up prices and exacerbating the shortage of places. Likewise, the review commissioned by the last Government and carried out by the hon. Member for Whitehaven and Workington (Josh MacAlister) found that profit caps would not work as it would be, “relatively easy for providers to reallocate income and expenditure to maintain profit levels”, a point already alluded to by the hon. Member for Twickenham. The capacity problem rests on the availability of places and the demand for those places. We spoke previously about the need to do much mo…
If there are fat margins to be made, why aren't more providers entering the market and bringing unit costs down? That has always been the vexing question. More pressingly: the Bill is actually not a profit cap but a retrospective clawback — proposed new section 30ZM. Is the intention to recover the entire surplus above whatever is deemed a fair return, or only a penalty proportional to it? And what is the mechanism if a provider simply doesn't pay?It is good to see you in the Chair, Mr Betts. I rise briefly to echo some of the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston and to ask a couple of questions. I have total sympathy with what Ministers are trying to do here. Having spent a bit of time at the DFE, I know the pain of seeing the amounts of money going out from local authorities for some very expensive placements. The thing I always found vexing, and still do to this day, is exactly the thing the shadow Minister mentioned. If there are fat margins to be had, ordinarily, in a Schumpeterian world, people come into that—again, I hesitate to use the word—market. The insurmountable barriers stopping that from happening were never clear to me. It was not just that additional supply was not coming in to bring down unit costs, but that, on occasion, there was no place to be found. It is very important that we understand the underlying economics of this, bearing in mind, as ever, that we are talking primarily about the care of children. The profit made by an entity cannot be limited, ultimately, because that is the residual left at the end of the year between revenue and cost. All one can do is either to choose not to use an entity that makes a profit of more than a certain amount, or seek some form of clawback. I note from the Bill that it is the latter approach that Ministers wish to take, as in proposed new section 30ZM. Do they seek to use this power as a fine—a penalty—for having a profit above whatever is deemed the appropriate level, or in proportion to it? In other words, do they seek to claw back the entirety of the surplus—the profit made—in excess of what is deemed a fair return?
- Amendment 42 would extend the profit-cap power to private schools with SEND placements, but the CMA study that underpins Clause 14 was specifically scoped to children's social care placements — it provides no evidence base for a blanket cap on private schools. We are already considering the role of independent special schools as part of our wider SEND reforms and will not pre-empt that work with a provision that hasn't gone through proper stakeholder engagement. On Amendment 25: the Secretary of State must already consult extensively before triggering the cap, and that consultation plus the affirmative regulations would cover the ground the amendment requires — so existing safeguards make it duplicative. On how the clawback works: the Secretary of State will assess annual returns, including whether revenue not recorded as profit should have been, and may issue civil monetary penalties for any breach. Breaches can also be treated as aggravating factors. We are not targeting elimination of profit — providers need a fair return — and the level of any cap will depend on market conditions at the time. The CMA found margins of 19%–36% in the placements market; that level is unacceptable and must end.
Amendment 42, in the name of the hon. Member for Twickenham, seeks to extend the powers to cap profits of Ofsted-registered non-local authority providers of children’s homes and independent fostering services to also cover private schools with caring responsibilities and offering SEND provision. As hon. Members will be aware, the Competition and Markets Authority found the children’s social care placements market to be dysfunctional, estimating that the largest private providers were making profit margins well above what would be expected in a well-functioning market. It is important to be clear that the study was restricted to looking at the state of the market for specific types of placements. It provides clear evidence of excess profit making by some providers of these placements, but its scope did not extend to looking at private schools. We set out a wider package of measures in “Keeping children safe, helping families thrive”, which we expect will rein in profiteering among children’s social care providers, and the profit cap is intended as a last resort if they fail to do so. Children and young people with special educational needs are found throughout the private school sector, and it is not our intention to introduce a blanket cap on profits in private schools that offer special educational provision. With regards to private special schools, they can play an important role in the special educational needs and disability system, particularly in meeting low-incidence needs. Many have important expertise, but we recognise that independent special schools have higher costs than maintained special schools and academies. The Government are very aware of the challenges in the SEND system, and we understand how urgently we need to address them. But these complex issues need a considered approach to deliver sustainable change. As part of that work, we are considering the role and place of independent special schools. It would not be appropriate to introduce a profit…
- The Minister knows the SEND system is in crisis — he and his colleagues hear it in the Chamber every other week. Local authority deficits are being driven in significant part by spending on private SEND provision, yet the Government are willing to slap VAT on independent school fees but hesitant to cap profits by the clearest outliers. Amendment 42 is a targeted intervention, not a blanket measure. The pharmaceutical industry analogy is instructive: Government has for years controlled both prices and profits in that sector as the monopoly purchaser. Local authorities are the de facto monopoly purchaser here and could do the same. I'm pressing Amendment 42 to a vote.
I thank the Minister for his kind remarks about my comments, but he is aware that the SEND system is in crisis—he and his fellow Ministers hear that every other week in the Chamber. He knows that local authority finances are on the brink because of SEND costs, and that those deficits are driven to a certain extent by the spending on private provision. I am curious as to why the Government are so hesitant to take action in this space, yet they are happy to slap VAT on parents wishing to send their children to independent schools. This amendment is about tackling specific providers that are clear outliers in the fees they are charging. It is a targeted intervention that could really help local authorities and, in turn, children who are desperate for more support that local authorities cannot provide. The right hon. Member for East Hampshire talked about whether we can control profitability. I used to work in the pharmaceutical industry, in which the Government have for many years had a control on not only prices but profits and have clawed back profits. As a monopoly purchaser of services, the Government can act on behalf of NHS trusts around the country, and they could do something similar for local authorities where needed, whether it is with special schools or private social care providers. I would like to press amendment 42 to a vote.
- The Minister's remarks on the enforcement hurdles were reassuring — it is clear he grasps how hard this will be to use in practice. This is not a profit cap; it is a retrospective clawback, which gives providers advance notice and every opportunity to move money to look compliant. As my right hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire put it, once you have tried to claw money back from people after the fact and given them a right of appeal, they can just collapse the entity and walk away. The focus must remain on supply. We will put Amendment 25 to a vote.
I was quite reassured by the Minister’s thoughtful comments and his clear appreciation of the difficulty and extreme number of obstacles to making this power practicably usable. Kenneth Clark said that he did not know what civilisation was, but he knew it when he saw it, and I think quite a few Members of this House, including those on the Government Benches, have the same feeling about excess profits—we feel that they are too high, but we struggle to say what we think an acceptable level would be. That challenge will not get any easier over time. As ever, my right hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire is more articulate than I am, and he made the point well that this is not a profit cap but a retrospective clawback mechanism, which is another reason why it will be so hard to use in practice. Unless we are going to get into problems of retrospection and loads of legal action, we will be giving people advance warning, which will give them time to move money around and ensure that things look compliant. I am keen to move amendment 25 to a vote. I promise that we will make great progress on subsequent clauses; I am not trying to be a dog in the manger. I understand and accept the Minister’s arguments about the things that the Secretary of State would do before commencing such a power—that was reassuring—but there should be a national assessment of the number of available placements. The Minister said that such things happen locally, and that someone could tot them up; I hope the Government will do that. It would be a powerful thing for the Minister to do and would give him huge clout in driving this agenda forward, so I hope he will do it even if the Committee votes against this amendment. There should be a German word for a bit of data that we think should exist—we look on the internet and think we should be able to find it, but somehow it does not exist. This assessment of what is available out there is an example of that. I am keen to put our amendment to the vo…
- Clause 15 and Clause 16 introduce civil monetary penalties for failing to comply with the financial oversight scheme and, if triggered, any profit cap. Penalties can reach to the highest level of the provider's corporate structure. Clause 16 also requires a notice of intention before any penalty is issued and gives providers the right to make representations. Unpaid penalties will accrue interest at the Judgments Act 1838 standard rate and can be recovered as a civil debt. All penalty receipts go into the Consolidated Fund. Providers may appeal to the first-tier tribunal.
My Department will introduce civil monetary penalties to compel children’s care providers to comply with the financial oversight scheme and—if implemented in the future—the profit cap. It is imperative that providers comply with the scheme in order to protect vulnerable children from the disruption to their homes and care that could result from a sudden market exit by the providers of their placements. If providers do not comply, we will tackle that effectively by introducing penalties. Penalties could apply up to the highest level of the organisational structure of a provider that has failed to comply with the scheme. If a profit cap is introduced in future, clauses 15 and 16 provide for civil monetary penalties for breaches of any profit cap, to be issued at provider level. The Secretary of State will be able to issue monetary penalties for breaches of the cap, and for failure to comply with annual return requirements. Both are essential to allow for the proper administration of the cap—if we need to bring it in in the future. Furthermore, if providers fail to comply, action may be taken against their registration. The Care Standards Act 2000 is amended to give Ofsted the power to suspend or cancel the registration of a person, in respect of a children’s home or fostering agency, if they have failed to comply with either measure. Clause 16 sets out the process that both the Secretary of State and Ofsted must follow when issuing civil monetary penalties under provisions in the Bill. It will ensure that any penalties are issued fairly and consistently. It places a duty on the Secretary of State and Ofsted, when issuing a monetary penalty, to serve a notice of intention on the recipient. They must also take into account any representations from the recipient of the notice before a final decision to issue a penalty is made. The clause sets out that the Secretary of State or Ofsted may issue a monetary penalty of any amount. The only exceptions to that are when the Sec…
- Clause 15 is consequential on Clause 14 and we won't oppose it, but the enforcement challenge is even more acute than the profit-cap debate suggested. Not all institutions are doing the same thing: a child needing round-the-clock respiratory support in an independent special school is not like for like with a child in a mainstream setting, so defining an "acceptable" profit level within a single institution will be genuinely difficult. And the right of appeal in proposed new Schedule 1A(6) further extends the window for providers to manage their books retrospectively, collapse entities, and escape collection. The focus has to be supply.
I will be much briefer, because this is essentially a consequential clause relating to clause 14, but I want to touch on a couple of things. A further difficulty in enforcing this profit clawback, and understanding what excess profit is, is that even within a single market not all these institutions are doing the same thing. In a funny way, the remarks that the hon. Member for Twickenham made about clause 14 go to that point. We look at the very large unit costs—that is a horrible expression—or the costs per child of care in independent special schools, and we think, “Gosh, these unit costs are so high. Surely we have to do something about this.” The Government and the Opposition are seized of that point—we do not want to spend money that we do not need to spend—but we should sometimes look at the individual cases. For example, a child in my constituency who has just been put into one of these brilliant institutions—Red Kite, over in Northamptonshire—literally needs constant help just to keep breathing, so we have to be clear about whether these things are really like for like. It is true that that independent special school is a lot more expensive than a mainstream school, but is it really like for like? As we think about capping profits in this industry, a further complexity is that, depending on the caseload and the child, the profit and risk levels will be different. Within an individual institution, there could be some unbelievably hard-to-place, hard-to-look-after, very difficult and expensive children, alongside other children, so it will not be easy to work out an acceptable level of profit. Proposed new schedule 1A(6), on the right of appeal against imposition of monetary penalty, further extends the opportunities for people to game the system. First, it is retrospective—it is about clawing money back from people after the fact, which gives them an opportunity to manage their profits so they look like they are compliant—and then there is a right of appeal.…
- Clause 17 enables information sharing between Ofsted and the Department to make the financial oversight scheme and profit-cap regime work. Bringing together financial, corporate-performance and quality indicators across providers is essential for the early-warning system. This clause doesn't override data protection legislation — proposed new section 30ZO(8) makes that explicit.
Clause 17 enables information sharing between Ofsted and my Department to ensure the effective functioning of the financial oversight scheme and profit cap regime. Sharing relevant information also supports Ofsted’s functions under part 2 of the Care Standards Act 2000. For the purposes of a financial oversight scheme, effective information and the sharing agreements that are in place between my Department and Ofsted are crucial, and they will enable us to bring together financial corporate performance and quality indicators about individual providers to inform decision making. This clause does not authorise the processing of data, which would contravene data protection legislation.
- Ofsted's chief inspector can already share information with the Secretary of State. What gap does Clause 17 actually fill? Given that proposed new section 30ZO(8) already says nothing here can contravene UK GDPR, what legal authority did Ofsted lack before?
I have a brief question. I understand what the Minister is trying to do here; the Secretary of State is taking powers to require the Ofsted chief inspector to share information with them in connection with the functions under this part. Can the Minister explain how that differs from the current ability of His Majesty’s chief inspector to share information with the Secretary of State? As the Minister just said, proposed new section 30ZO(8) is clear that it cannot contravene the GDPR legislation anyway, so I am trying to understand what gap this clause is trying to fix.
- Under Clause 17 the Department will share with local authorities which providers are subject to the financial oversight scheme and issue advance warning notices where a provider is genuinely at risk of failing — but commercially sensitive information submitted by providers will not be shared with local authorities or the sector. Where providers breach scheme requirements, the Department will publish the civil monetary penalties imposed for transparency.
I thank the shadow Minister for that. Data will be shared to other parties as part of the financial oversight scheme. It is worth saying that the Department will share with local authorities which providers meet the financial oversight conditions and are subject to the financial oversight scheme. That is to support their local sufficiency and contingency planning. To ensure that commercially sensitive information is kept confidential, we will not share any provider information submitted as part of this scheme with local authorities or the sector. The Department will use this information to make an assessment of financial risk and issue an advance warning notice to local authorities where there is a real possibility that financial risk could lead a provider to cease operating. Finally, where providers or their corporate owners, as I mentioned earlier, breach the requirements of this scheme, the Department will publish information on civil monetary penalties imposed. That is to be transparent about providers who fail to comply with the scheme. Question put and agreed to. Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 18 Use of agency workers for children’s social care work Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 18 creates a regulation-making power to tackle the affordability and stability problems caused by over-reliance on agency workers in local authority children's social care. Agency workers remain important — this isn't about eliminating them — but they must not become a permanent substitute for a stable workforce. Regulations will set clear expectations for local authorities, recruitment agencies and agency workers alike; there is a duty to consult before any regulations are made. Reducing agency spend will free up local authority budgets for services and for improving the permanent-employment offer. Existing statutory guidance already applies to social workers; the clause extends the framework to the wider children's social care workforce.Clause 18, through the introduction of a regulation-making power, will allow the Government to take stronger action to alleviate the significant affordability and stability challenges that have arisen from the increase in the use and cost of agency workers in local authority children’s social care in England. This clause ensures that, while agency workers remain an important part of local authority children’s social care, they do not become a long-term replacement for a permanent, stable workforce. The clause will allow the Secretary of State to introduce regulations on the use of agency workers in English local authority children’s social care services. It will strengthen the existing regulatory framework for the use of agency social workers in local authority children’s social care services, which is currently set out in statutory guidance. It will also extend the framework beyond the social workers to the wider local authority children’s social care workforce, such as agency workers delivering targeted early intervention or family help. We remain committed to working in partnership with stakeholders across the children’s social care system, including agencies, to ensure that the proposals implemented are proportionate and effective. The clause provides a duty to consult ahead of introducing regulations. Regulations will make it clear to local authorities, the recruitment sector and agency workers what they should expect from each other. The consistency that that brings to the market will benefit all parties. Reducing local authority spend on agency workers will allow local authorities to invest more in services supporting children and families and enhance the offer to permanent employees. I hope that the Committee agrees that the clause should stand part of the Bill.
- Clause 18 has two quite different objectives sitting in tension: improving workforce stability on the one hand, and cutting local authority spend on the other. Crudely capping agency pay without fixing the underlying supply problem risks lengthening lead times for families and at-risk children. The agency share has grown — from about 19% in 2017 to just under 22% now — but it hasn't exploded as some suggest. There are huge regional variations: London consistently uses far more agency staff than other areas; Bradford and Leeds are radically different from each other. A one-size-fits-all national cap applied to places with completely different market dynamics is risky. A poll found only 16% of agency workers support national rules, because many choose agency working precisely for the flexibility it offers. The last Government's approach of encouraging voluntary regional compacts was more proportionate. Will the regulations allow differentiation by region or even by local authority?
We have not tabled an amendment to clause 18, but I have a lot of questions similar to those we have been asking about attempts to introduce profit capping for children’s care homes. The Government clearly have two quite different hopes for this measure. On the one hand, the explanatory notes on the Bill say that strengthening the regulatory framework for the use of agency workers within local authority children’s social care services will improve the stability and quality of the agency workforce. That is the first hope. However, the notes also say that reducing local authority spend on agency workers will allow local authorities to invest more in services supporting children and families and enhance the offer to permanent employees. Those are two quite different objectives in different clauses of the Bill. The last Government were taking steps to increase the number of people in social work. Those steps included the “step up to social work” scheme and the creation of social work apprenticeships, as well as advertising some of the amazing things that people can do and be part of as social workers. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to our social workers. They are amazing people. Theirs is a tough job, but people feel an enormous sense of pride in what they do, and when they look back on their careers they can reflect that they have helped a lot of people. It is an amazing profession. According to the most recent DFE statistics, there were over 33,000 full-time social workers in post in 2023. That is 4,600 more than in 2017, or a 16% increase. The caseload per full-time equivalent worker had dropped from 17.7 cases to 16, the lowest in the series. We can say that that number is still too high, but it has at least been going in the right direction during my time in Parliament. Just under one in five of the full-time equivalents is an agency worker, and the agency share has gone up, but sometimes people assume that it has gone up more than it has. In fact, from 201…
- Care-experienced children tell me repeatedly that the biggest damage to their lives is constant staff turnover — a new social worker every few months, having to relive their trauma each time. So clamping down on excess agency use is right. But the measures don't necessarily tackle why social workers choose agency contracts in the first place: flexibility, pay, better conditions. We also need funded continuous professional development for social workers, comparable to what doctors receive across their careers. Without addressing those root causes, regulations alone won't deliver a stable permanent workforce.
I join the shadow Minister in paying tribute to our social care workforce. Social care is an incredibly tough job, and I take my hat off to anybody who goes into the profession. I understand the Government’s motivation and objectives, which are similar to those behind the provisions on care providers and the costs involved. We should also think about the children’s experience. Whenever I have spoken to care-experienced children, they have told me that their biggest frustration is with the huge turnover of staff, which means that they have to share their stories and relive their trauma a number of times. Often, they have a new social worker every few months. It is therefore important to try to clamp down on the use of agency workers. However, I share the shadow Minister’s concerns about what the measures will mean in terms of ensuring that we have an adequate workforce. They do not necessarily tackle some of the root problems that motivate social workers to opt for agency contracts. They do not tackle challenges around costs and pay and conditions in the context of the cost of living crisis, nor do they address the fact that workers may get flexibility through agency working that they do not get in a permanent role. We need also to look at supporting continuous professional development for qualified social workers, as we do with doctors, who receive 10 years-worth of funded training and development on the job. We do not do something similar for social workers. I want to hear more from the Minister about whether the Government have a workforce strategy to address the root causes of more and more social workers opting for agency contracts, which is not good for taxpayers or for the child’s experience. How can we address the fundamental causes and get more people into the workforce?
- Many local authorities are already successfully converting agency workers into permanent staff. The principle here is clear: over-reliance on agency workers is bad for workforce stability and for the children being served. Local authorities will still be able to use agency workers where that is the most appropriate option under the regulatory framework. We're looking at developing price caps on a regional basis — and we'll consult before doing anything. The clause also brings the wider children's social care workforce under the framework, not just social workers.
I thank both hon. Members for their probing of the clause. No amendment has been tabled, and there seems to be general agreement that the principle is right. Over-reliance on agency workers contributes to workforce instability, which has implications for both the workforce and the children it is there to serve. It also puts pressure on local authority budgets. I thank both hon. Members for recognising the challenging but hugely valuable work of social workers, which is often unrecognised and un-thanked. It is good that we take the opportunity to put on record our collective gratitude to them for the difficult work that they do. Many local authorities are already demonstrating success in transitioning agency workers into their permanent workforces. People who work in social care need the right environment so that they can thrive, personally and professionally. We recognise that regulation alone is not the answer, but the Government are supporting local authorities to attract and retain children’s social workers and provide positive working environments for all who work in children’s social care, because ultimately children will benefit. Local authorities will still be able to use agency workers if doing so is the most appropriate resourcing option and in line with the regulatory framework, but it is important to reduce local authority spend on agency staff and to allow local authorities to reinvest in the permanent children’s social care workforce. Statutory guidance that has already been issued on this matter has allowed the Government to act quickly to introduce a new framework. The framework focuses on social workers, but other Government Departments are working on the same issue. Guidance can be departed from in certain circumstances, so introducing regulations on the use of agency workers is appropriate and proportionate. It is important that we strengthen the regulatory framework on the use of agency workers in children’s social care to ensure that it is legall…
- Does Clause 18 give the Government power to cap at any level of granularity — including at individual local authority level? So in principle Westminster could have a different rate from County Durham?
I think the Minister answered this question when she said that, in respect of caps, she was working on a regional basis, but does the provision give the Government the power to cap on any basis, including at a local authority level? The Government could say that the cap is x in Westminster and y in County Durham—is my understanding correct?
- We're considering a regional approach, but we will look at the evidence and consult. That's important, because what we all agree on in principle has to be got right in detail.
As is becoming more evident as the Committee progresses, the hon. Member is very focused on the detail. Obviously, that is something that we will work through as part of our development of the statutory regulations. We will consider developing price caps on a regional basis, but we will look at the evidence and consult as well. That is important, because I think we all agree in principle on the provision, and we will work hard and consult to ensure that we get it right. Question put and agreed to. Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 19 Ill-treatment or wilful neglect: children aged 16 and 17 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
- Clause 19 closes a genuine gap: under-16s are protected by the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, over-18s in regulated care by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, but 16 and 17-year-olds in regulated children's social care settings or youth detention accommodation are currently unprotected from prosecution of carers or providers for ill treatment or wilful neglect. We are expanding the 2015 Act to cover them.
Clause 19 amends sections 20, 21 and 25 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. That Act protects over-18s in regulated social care settings and everyone provided with certain healthcare from ill treatment and wilful neglect, and the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 protects all under-16s from cruelty, so if someone is under 16 or over 18 there is protection in place to prosecute perpetrators of abuse. However, there is a gap that means that carers or care providers involved in the wilful neglect of 16 and 17-year-olds in regulated children’s social care settings or youth detention accommodation cannot be prosecuted. We are therefore expanding the 2015 Act so that the offence includes protections for 16 and 17-years-olds. The change means that where there has been ill treatment or wilful neglect by those providing care or support in regulated establishments, the law will support the relevant authorities in prosecuting the individuals and providers involved. I am sure we all want the right legal protections to be in place for all children, and for the law to support action being taken against those involved in abuse or neglect. I hope the Committee agrees that the clause should stand part of the Bill.
- We support Clause 19. Two questions. First, should the ill treatment or wilful neglect of a 16 or 17-year-old in a regulated care setting be made a statutory aggravating factor at sentencing, given the particular vulnerability of these children? Second, about 40% of the youth estate are now on remand, not sentenced. Will the new offence apply to 16 and 17-year-olds held on remand in youth detention accommodation, or only to those who have been sentenced?
We support clause 19, which closes an important gap in the law regarding the ill treatment and neglect of 16 and 17-year-olds. I have some specific questions. Have the Government considered making the ill treatment or wilful neglect of a child aged 16 or 17 in a children’s home or other regulated setting, as set out in the Bill, an aggravating factor in the sentencing of those cases? The low level of the terms “ill treatment” and “wilful neglect” sits uncomfortably beside the context, reality and vulnerability of those children. Will the Government think about the criminal justice side of that? My second question is about children who are held on remand in the youth estate. Members who have read my Substack will know that, both under the last Government and this one, I have complained a lot about the growth in the remand population in the adult and youth estates, and the court delays that drive that. A lot of children now in the youth estate are held on remand—about 40%—so can the Minister confirm that these provisions will apply to children who are held on remand in youth detention accommodation, and not just to those who have been sentenced? Those on remand are there temporarily, and as we fix one important hole in the law, I want to check whether we need to fix another one, or whether it is already covered. I am happy if the Minister wants to write to us on that point because it is quite detailed.
- The change will cover children's homes, residential family centres, accommodation for holiday schemes for disabled children, supported accommodation — and yes, youth detention accommodation. Children held on remand are in youth detention accommodation and are therefore covered. Other protections for all children, including 16 to 17-year-olds, already exist across children's social care settings.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his support for the clause. To answer his second question, the change will affect regulated establishments in children’s social care, including youth detention accommodation. It will therefore cover children’s homes, residential family centres, accommodation where holiday schemes for disabled children are provided, and supported accommodation settings. There are other measures already in place to protect all children, including 16 to 17-year-olds, against abuse and neglect within children’s social care settings and youth detention accommodation. This clause is specifically intended to address the current legal gap.
- The most natural reading is that remand children are covered because they are in YOIs — but could you check with officials to make sure we haven't accidentally missed them, given they are there temporarily rather than permanently?
I think the most natural reading is that those children should be covered, because they are in the YOIs. I just wondered whether there was a potential issue because they are not permanently there; they are just on remand. I wonder whether the Minister could check with her officials to ensure that we are not missing an opportunity.
- My understanding is that remand children in youth detention accommodation are covered, but I will double-check. On the aggravating-factor point: I will pass that to the Ministry of Justice — it may well be worth considering alongside this change in education legislation.
I will double-check on the hon. Gentleman’s behalf, but my understanding is that they will be covered, given that they come within the remit of youth detention accommodation. I will certainly convey his point about wilful neglect being an aggravating factor within the criminal justice system as a query to the Ministry of Justice, as it may be worth considering with the change being brought through in this education legislation. With that, I commend the clause to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 20 Employment of children in England Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
- Clause 20 amends the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 to require employment permits for all working children in England and give children and employers greater flexibility about when children can work — including additional Sunday hours and working before and after school. The current restriction to two hours on a Sunday and a 7 pm cut-off often makes it unviable for businesses to employ children at all. We consulted children directly: they universally wanted more flexibility in when they can work, not in how much. This clause also replaces the patchwork of local authority byelaws with a single set of Secretary of State regulations — fairer to children, parents and employers who operate across authority boundaries.
The clause seeks to amend the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. To help to develop this policy, we spoke to both children and employers. The changes in the clause are the ones that they told us they would like to see. The clause will require all children in England to have an employment permit in order to undertake suitable employment. The permit will make local authorities aware of the children working in their area. It will ensure that children are safeguarded as they undertake valuable employment, while still having access to their education. The measure will give more flexibility to children and employers in relation to when children can work, which will give children more opportunities to take up suitable employment while still ensuring that their health, development and education outcomes are supported. Allowing children to work additional hours on a Sunday, and before and after school, will help them to benefit from additional suitable employment opportunities. Employment can contribute to a child’s development, introduce them to the world of work and develop key employability skills. The clause will also replace a power for local authorities to make byelaws in relation to child employment with a power for the Secretary of State to make regulations in relation to the employment of children in England. Having a single set of regulations that apply to all children who work in England, rather than each local authority having its own byelaws, will ensure fairness in outcomes for all children in England. Our changes will also make it easier for children and their parents to understand what roles they can undertake, and for employers to know on what basis they can employ a child. They also mean that as types of work change, we will be able to restrict new types of employment that are not suitable for children more quickly. Additionally, we will be able to make previously restricted employments available for children, should changes in the way that they are carri…
- As a localist I note we are removing another local authority power, but I don't have a strong objection because the overall effect is liberalising. My practical concern is about the transition: Birmingham's byelaws differ from Richmond's in which activities 13-year-olds may do. Has the Department mapped every authority's current byelaws against what the new regulations will say, so that authorities, employers and families can see clearly what changes for them specifically?
As the Minister says, the clause essentially centralises and harmonises differences in rules on children’s employment, which are currently set partly at the local level. As a localist, I start with a small degree of nervousness, in so far as we are taking away a local authority power. We have done that an awful lot over the last 40 years. I do not have a great objection to this measure, because in general it is a liberalisation overall. The notes provided by the Library are quite good, in so far as they talk about the extensions in different ways that this will bring about in most local authorities. I do have one slight nervousness, though, from a practical rather than a philosophical point of view. When we replace a complicated patchwork quilt and a lot of variation with a single national rule, we must check that every place is clear about the impact. To pick a random example used in the Library briefing, the byelaws of Birmingham city council do not include the line allowing 13-year-olds to work on car washing by hand in a private residential setting that is present in Richmond upon Thames and in the model byelaws. I do not know whether the Government have a spreadsheet or an assessment somewhere detailing the current differences between the laws in all the different places. I hope that they do, because although in general it sounds like we are harmonising all these things across the country in a way that is liberalising, by having more times when young people and children can work, in some cases there might be a restriction, and it would not be a small thing for anyone caught by that restriction to be found breaking the law on the employment of children. Although ignorance of the law is no defence, one might feel that it perhaps should be where people have been happily working away on the basis of their local authority’s byelaws for some time, when suddenly, without them clocking it—because they do not read Hansard every day—the law changes and they can no longer…
- What prompted this? Children's employment is not an ill to be mitigated — it's genuinely beneficial. The most common answer when I ask business leaders how old they were when they first did paid work is 14. In the last 25 years under-16 and under-18 employment has fallen sharply, partly because over-restrictive rules make it unviable for employers. The liberalising elements — later hours, Sunday flexibility — are welcome, but I'd like to understand the rationale for the restricting elements in the clause too.
I am not at all opposed to the clause, but I am curious to know what prompted it. What outside world events made us rethink the regulations? I heard what the Minister said about consulting young people, but I am struggling slightly to picture that conversation, where the kid goes, “You know, what we really need is a change in the employer licensing regulations.” But fair enough. The changes are in some ways liberalising by increasing the latest hour from 7 o’clock to 8 and allowing Sunday working, but in other ways they are restricting. I am interested in what is behind that. There are risks to guard against in the employment of children, but the employment of children is not in itself an ill to be mitigated. There are many benefits to the child in having that opportunity. In fact, the biggest gripe we hear from employers about young people—it happens again and again—is about what some call soft skills, or employability skills or workplace skills. Whatever we want to call it, those are skills that people develop at work. Many times over the years, whenever I have had a group of leaders and industry together, I have gone round the room and literally asked, “How old were you when you first did a day of paid work?” The most typical, most common answer is 14—some say 15, and for some it is younger. It is important that we learn from that. In the last 25 years, there has been a sharp decline in the number of under-16s and under-18s doing paid work. That is partly because of the decline in certain job types—there are not many paper rounds or milk rounds any more—and partly because of social attitudes. When we had public exams in the lower sixth and upper sixth for most children, that probably had an impact for the slightly older age groups. One of the reasons that employers find it daunting to employ children is that they are often unclear about what the regulations are, but they have a sense that there are risks, including reputational risks and so on. The explanatory no…
- I understand the objective. The National Network for Children in Employment and Entertainment has raised a concern about children working at televised or live sporting events with late finishes — for example, ball children at evening Wimbledon matches under the roof. The current licensing regime for children participating in sport may not cover all support roles. Has the Department spoken to the Network? Would Ministers consider allowing slightly later hours on Fridays and Saturdays for older teenagers in non-performance backstage roles in theatre, as the Network suggests?
I do not have a philosophical problem with this clause either. I was slightly surprised to find it when I was reading the Bill and to hear where it came from, but I understand what the Government are attempting to do. Before press releases start going out suggesting that the Lib Dems want to promote child labour, I will preface my next question with some feedback from the National Network for Children in Employment and Entertainment. It has raised some concerns that the later hour set out in the legislation does not fully address the employment of young people in televised and live sporting events. That is particularly the case where we now have the benefit of floodlights and roofs—I think of the late matches on centre court at Wimbledon, when we have ball boys and ball girls from the local area working there. I understand that there is a different licensing regime if children are participating in sport, but this measure would apply to some of the children working at those sporting events. What consideration have Ministers given to those sorts of situations? Have they spoken to the National Network for Children in Employment and Entertainment? For organisations with particular shift and working patterns—for example, those involving non-performance roles in theatres, including in lighting or backstage—the National Network for Children in Employment and Entertainment suggests allowing hours later than 8 pm on a Friday or Saturday for older teenagers, provided that the next day is not a school day. I am not necessarily suggesting that that is the right thing to do, but that is a suggestion made by that organisation given its needs. It would be good to get some clarification on when the current byelaws for child employment will cease and when regulations from the Secretary of State will replace them. Importantly, what consideration has been given to safeguarding and DBS checks of employers where young people are working? The right hon. Member for East Hampshire touched…
- Currently a child can work only two hours on a Sunday and must finish by 7 pm — restrictions that often make it economically unviable to employ them at all, even for a shift they could easily manage. Clause 20 doesn't change total weekly hours; it gives much greater flexibility about when those hours are taken. Employers and sector bodies have been clear that peak-demand periods and normal trading days are where the current rules most bite. The vast majority of local authorities already follow the model byelaws, so the change to a national framework brings consistency rather than wholesale disruption.
Considering the level of agreement on this provision, there is a significant amount of interest and questions around it. It might help if I clarify that currently a child can work for a maximum of only two hours on a Sunday and up to 7 pm at night, which restricts employment opportunities. It may not make business sense to employ a child who is able to work only a very short shift. We spoke with children while developing this policy, and they were pretty universally of the view that they would like to have more flexibility in when they can work, not necessarily in the amount that they wish to work. Clause 20 will not change the overall number of hours that a child can work, but it will give children much greater flexibility to maximise the opportunities that hopefully will become available to them as this area becomes more clearly set out as part of the legislation. Employers and sector bodies have set out the difficulties in being able to offer employment to a child either on a normal trading day or when they experience peak demand when the child has worked their requisite two hours. That often closes down opportunities that children could easily have had and would have enjoyed having. Businesses would appreciate having those children as part of their team, but the restrictions in the current arrangements often make that difficult to accommodate.
- What about babysitters? Is a family committing a criminal offence by asking a 15-year-old neighbour to babysit after 7 pm — or, under the new clause, after 8 pm?
I have a question about babysitters, which are one of the hardest cases here. This question is as much about the existing law as it is about the proposed change in the cut-off from 7 pm to 8 pm. Are people who employ babysitters after 7 pm or 8 pm committing a criminal offence under the clause?
- No — these regulations apply to formal employment registered with the local authority, not to informal arrangements like babysitting in a private home.
I do not believe that people register with their local authority to ask someone under the age of 16 who they know to babysit in their home. My understanding, therefore, is that these regulations would not apply in those circumstances. To explain another issue that these measures are intended to fix, the vast majority of local authorities simply follow the byelaw model, so they are already in place. However, some local authorities have additional restrictions in their rules for employing children. That has led to some local authorities, which may be geographically located directly next door to each other, having different restrictions. For example, one local authority might decide to add a role to the restricted employment list, but the other might not. That leaves children, parents and businesses, which do not always operate within local authority boundaries, somewhat confused. As the right hon. Member for East Hampshire pointed out, that can put employers off employing children, even where it might be to the benefit of both that these opportunities are available. Replacing the power for local authorities to make byelaws with the power for the Secretary of State to make these regulations will ensure fair outcomes for all children right across England. That means that a child, their parent or a business can know what work can be undertaken, and when and by whom, wherever they live in England. National employers will also hopefully be encouraged to employ children who are looking for these opportunities, as they will not be put off by inconsistencies around the country that create bureaucratic obstacles to opportunities. That will provide much-needed employment for businesses across the country. I hope that I have responded to the majority of concerns about this largely—I certainly get the impression—uncontested clause.
- Will the Government publish an authority-by-authority comparison showing what the current byelaws say versus what the new regulations will mean — so that those not simply following the model byelaws can see exactly what changes?
I thank the Minister for her patience. Will the Government undertake to have an authority-by-authority assessment of what the patchwork quilt looks like now? For everyone’s ease and benefit, what will the changes mean for those who are not just following the model byelaws, because they are maybe different in each different place? Is the Minister happy to at least go away and have a look at that?
- An assessment of local authorities' byelaws was undertaken as part of developing this legislation, and it confirmed that the vast majority already follow the model framework. The national regulations don't just create consistency — they create a better and more flexible approach that will unlock employment opportunities for children across England.
As part of the work to create the draft legislation that we are debating, an assessment of local authorities was undertaken. That assessment has not changed the view that a more consistent approach across the country would be beneficial to children, employers and their families—indeed, it threw up the fact that the vast majority of local authorities do follow the current byelaw framework. This clause not only creates a nationally consistent approach; it creates a better and more flexible approach for children, which will hopefully unlock opportunity for them to take their first steps on the employment ladder. Question put and agreed to. Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Vicky Foxcroft.)