6 judgments interpreting, applying, or limiting the provisions of this Act. Sorted by court tier then reverse-chronologically.
Old EU court rulings still bind UK courts when dealing with retained EU law. Only the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal can break free of them, and only with a clear, principled reason for doing so.
Section 6 entrenches pre-exit CJEU case law as authoritative on retained EU law and limits domestic courts' power to depart; the UKSC and EWCA may only depart applying the 1966 Practice-Statement style test, requiring a clear principled justification.
Holding. Section 6's framework for departing from retained EU case law is tightly constrained; the principled-justification test is the touchstone.
EU citizens living in the UK can rely directly on the rights set out in the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement when going to court. No extra UK legislation is needed to make those rights enforceable here.
Section 7A gives direct effect in domestic law to the Withdrawal Agreement, including its citizens' rights chapter; the Court confirmed that retained EU citizens can rely on those rights in domestic litigation without further implementing legislation.
Holding. Section 7A directly incorporates Withdrawal Agreement rights, including the Citizens' Rights Part Two, into UK law.
Senior UK courts can move away from old EU rulings on areas like copyright, but only when it genuinely seems the right thing to do. They apply the same cautious approach used when reconsidering their own past decisions.
The Court of Appeal articulated the framework under s.6(4) and (5) for when EWCA could depart from retained EU case law on copyright communication-to-the-public; the test echoes the 1966 Practice Statement, asking whether it appears right to do so.
Holding. Section 6(4)/(5) permits departure from retained EU case law where it appears right to do so, applying the Practice-Statement standard adapted to retained law.
The rule requiring Parliament to approve the Brexit deal was a process for politicians, not a right ordinary people could use to sue the Government over how the negotiations were handled.
Section 13's parliamentary-approval mechanism for the Withdrawal Agreement was effectively spent by the time the EU(Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 was passed; challenges to the conduct of negotiations did not give rise to justiciable rights under the s.13 framework.
Holding. Section 13's approval requirement is a procedural-parliamentary mechanism, not a source of justiciable individual rights.
Ministers can use Brexit fix-up powers to tidy up legal gaps caused by leaving the EU, but cannot use them to push through fresh policy changes or, for example, create serious new criminal offences.
Section 8's power to make regulations to address deficiencies in retained EU law is not a blanket Henry VIII power; the court emphasised that it must be exercised within the deficiency-correction scope and is subject to the s.8(7) exclusions (no creation of criminal offences carrying imprisonment etc.).
Holding. Section 8 regulations are confined to correcting failures arising from withdrawal and may not effect substantive policy change beyond that limit.
Before Brexit day actually happened, the courts would not entertain claims trying to reverse the decision to leave the EU. That was a political question for Parliament, not something judges could be asked to undo in advance.
Section 1's repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 was not justiciable in advance of the appointed exit day; the Divisional Court refused to entertain a challenge to the underlying decision to leave the EU at that procedural stage.
Holding. Section 1's coming into force on exit day is a political/legislative matter that does not give rise to a justiciable advance challenge.