9 judgments interpreting, applying, or limiting the provisions of this Act. Sorted by court tier then reverse-chronologically.
Whether someone can make their own decisions depends on what decision is in front of them. They might have capacity for one choice and not another, so the law looks at the particular question, not the person in general.
The s.1(2) presumption of capacity does not displace the structured analysis under ss.2 and 3; the assessment of decision-specific capacity must be framed by reference to the 'matter' (here, capacity to engage in sexual relations) construed with appropriate granularity.
Holding. Capacity is decision-specific; the framing of the relevant decision under s.1(2) controls the s.2 and s.3 inquiry.
Parents cannot sign away the freedom of a 16 or 17 year old who has a mental disorder, no matter how well-meaning. If the young person is being kept under constant control, the Court of Protection must be involved.
A parent's consent cannot authorise the deprivation of liberty of a 16- or 17-year-old child with mental disorder; the Court of Protection's s.16 powers (and the DoLS framework) must be engaged where the objective deprivation test is met.
Holding. Parental consent cannot authorise deprivation of liberty for incapacitous 16-17 year olds; the s.16 Court of Protection route applies.
If doctors and the family agree that stopping food and water for a patient in a long-term coma is the right thing, they do not have to go to court first. Court approval is only needed if there is a real disagreement.
Where clinicians and family agree that withdrawing CANH from a patient in a prolonged disorder of consciousness is in best interests under s.4, there is no requirement to seek a Court of Protection declaration before withdrawal; ECHR Articles 2 and 8 do not require court approval in agreed cases.
Holding. Court of Protection approval is not required to withdraw CANH where best-interests determination is agreed and made under s.4.
If a disabled or incapacitated adult is constantly watched and cannot choose to leave, they are being deprived of their liberty — even if they seem happy and are not complaining. That triggers safeguards.
Deprivation of liberty under Article 5 ECHR (and s.4A MCA) is determined by an objective 'acid test': whether the person is under continuous supervision and control and not free to leave; the person's compliance, lack of objection or living situation does not eliminate the deprivation.
Holding. Deprivation of liberty is judged objectively by the acid test; subjective compliance is irrelevant.
Whether someone has the mental capacity to handle their own lawsuit depends on the real decisions the case demands of them — including what a sensible settlement would look like. It is not about general legal know-how.
Capacity for litigation purposes is to be assessed by reference to the decision actually required of the litigant in the particular proceedings; capacity to settle a personal-injury claim must take account of the wider scope of the realistic settlement that might be achieved.
Holding. Litigation capacity under s.2 is judged by reference to the decision the proceedings actually require, not a generic litigation construct.
When a patient cannot decide for themselves, doctors must look at what is right for that person as a whole — their wishes, beliefs and values — not just whether the treatment will work medically. A doctor's view of futility is not the final word.
The s.4 best-interests evaluation is from the patient's standpoint, considering past wishes, beliefs and values; clinicians cannot withhold treatment merely because they consider it futile in their own clinical judgment if it would not be in the patient's best interests on the wider statutory inquiry.
Holding. Section 4 best-interests is patient-centred and holistic; clinical futility is not the same as best-interests assessment.
When deciding whether someone can choose to live with or see a particular person, the assessment must include what that person is actually like — including any risk they pose. Generic capacity is not enough.
Section 3's elements of decision-making must be considered in light of the specific decision; for cohabitation/contact with a particular person, the relevant information includes the other person's character and history insofar as it bears on safety.
Holding. Section 3's information-set is decision-specific and includes person-specific risks where relevant to the choice.
A carer or professional is only protected from being sued for treating someone without consent if they reasonably believed the person could not decide and that the treatment was in their best interests. Using force needs extra justification.
Section 5's protection from liability for acts done in connection with care or treatment requires the actor to have reasonably believed the person lacked capacity and that the act was in their best interests; the protection does not extend to acts that constitute restraint without satisfying s.6.
Holding. Section 5 immunity requires reasonable belief in lack of capacity and best-interests basis; restraint requires additional s.6 conditions.
Someone formally held in a care home has a right to challenge it in court, and their appointed representative must actively help them do that. Sitting back and ignoring the person's wishes is not acceptable.
Section 21A challenges to standard authorisations must be brought promptly; the relevant person's representative (RPR) has a duty to ensure that the person's wishes to challenge are heard and to facilitate access to the s.21A jurisdiction.
Holding. Section 21A challenges to DoLS authorisations require active RPR engagement to ensure access to the court.