12 judgments interpreting, applying, or limiting the provisions of this Act. Sorted by court tier then reverse-chronologically.
Putting someone on the sex offenders register for life with no way ever to ask for review breaches their human rights. There must be some chance, however limited, to show that ongoing registration is no longer needed.
Indefinite notification under Schedule 3 (the sex-offender notification regime) without any mechanism for review was held incompatible with Article 8 ECHR; the absence of any opportunity for the offender to demonstrate that registration is no longer necessary made the regime disproportionate.
Holding. Schedule 3's indefinite notification scheme without review was incompatible with Article 8; declaration of incompatibility issued under HRA s.4.
For sexual activity with a child under 13, believing they were older is no defence at all. For 13 to 15 year olds, you can only escape liability if your belief in their age was both genuine and reasonable.
Section 9 (sexual activity with a child under 16) likewise carries strict liability as to age where the complainant is under 13; for complainants aged 13–15, the defence of reasonable belief in age requires the defendant's belief to be both honest and reasonable.
Holding. Section 9's reasonable-belief-in-age defence is unavailable where the complainant is under 13.
Lying about whether you have had a vasectomy does not turn sex into rape. Only lies that go to the very nature of the act itself — not its possible consequences — can wipe out consent.
A lie about a vasectomy (or contraceptive status) does not, by itself, vitiate consent to sexual intercourse under s.74; only deceptions that go to the nature or purpose of the act, or as to identity, are sufficient — deceptions about collateral consequences do not negative consent.
Holding. Deceptions about reproductive consequences do not vitiate s.74 consent; only deceptions closely connected to the sexual act do.
If someone only agreed to sex because they were actively deceived about their partner's gender, a rape conviction can stand. The deception has to be central to why they consented, not a minor detail.
The Court of Appeal confirmed McNally's principle that gender deception sufficiently connected to the sexual act vitiates s.74 consent and supports a s.1 conviction; the test focuses on whether the deception was about a matter of fundamental quality to the consent given.
Holding. Section 1 rape can be made out where consent was procured by gender deception fundamental to the complainant's choice.
If someone agrees to sex believing their partner is a particular gender, and is actively deceived about that, the law can treat the consent as no consent at all. The lie has to be central to why they said yes.
Deception as to gender — a defendant assigned female at birth presenting as male — vitiates consent under s.74 where it goes to a matter of fundamental quality of the sexual act for the complainant; the test is whether the deception is sufficiently closely connected to the act.
Holding. Gender deception that is fundamental to the complainant's consent vitiates consent under s.74.
Court orders restricting where a sex offender can go or what they can do must match the actual risk they pose. Sweeping bans with no evidence behind them are not allowed.
Sexual Offences Prevention Orders (now Sexual Harm Prevention Orders under s.103A) must be necessary and proportionate; the court emphasised the requirement of risk-based justification and the need to confine the order's terms to its protective purpose.
Holding. SOPO/SHPO terms must be tailored to the risk and proportionate; expansive prohibitions without evidential basis are impermissible.
If you trick someone about why a sexual act is happening — for example, pretending it is for medical reasons when really you are filming them — the law treats them as not having consented at all. No further argument is allowed.
Where a defendant procures the complainant to engage in sexual activity by deception as to the defendant's identity or the purpose of the act (here, to humiliate by online filming), s.76 conclusive presumptions are engaged.
Holding. Section 76(2)(a) conclusive presumption applies where the defendant deceives as to the purpose of the sexual act.
A drunk person can still consent to sex — but only if they were drunk enough to lose the ability to choose, in which case any sex was without consent. Juries have to look at the specific facts.
Drunkenness does not automatically remove capacity to consent under s.74; intoxication and consent require fact-specific jury direction, and a complainant may consent while drunk provided she retains the capacity to choose whether to do so.
Holding. Consent under s.74 is not negatived by drunkenness alone; the jury must decide whether the complainant retained capacity to choose.
Threatening lies that pressure someone into sex — like saying they will be killed if they refuse — do not trigger the automatic no-consent rule, but they can still defeat consent under the general test. The shortcut presumption is kept narrow.
The s.76 conclusive presumption is to be construed strictly; deception that the complainant would be killed if she did not have intercourse did not engage s.76 because it was not deception as to the nature or purpose of the act, but the conviction stood on s.74 grounds.
Holding. Section 76 deceptions are narrowly confined to nature/purpose and impersonation; coercive deceptions fall under s.74.
If you groom a child online and then travel to meet them, the offence is already complete the moment you set off. No sexual contact needs to happen — the law catches the planning stage.
Section 15 (meeting a child following sexual grooming) does not require any sexual activity to have taken place; the offence is complete on the travel or arrangement of a meeting following two earlier communications, even if no sexual contact ever ensues.
Holding. Section 15 is a preventive grooming offence complete at the meeting/travel stage, regardless of subsequent sexual conduct.
Whether a touch counts as sexual is for the jury to decide using ordinary common sense. They look at what happened, why, and the surrounding circumstances — not just the defendant's intention.
Whether touching is 'sexual' under s.78 (and thus s.3 sexual assault) is determined by reference to a reasonable person's view of the circumstances, the touching's purpose, and the parties' conduct; the test is partly objective and partly purpose-led.
Holding. Section 78's definition of 'sexual' is applied through a two-stage objective/subjective inquiry by the jury.
Agreeing to sex with a condom is not the same as agreeing to sex without one. Secretly removing a condom — sometimes called stealthing — can amount to rape because the person never consented to that act.
The Divisional Court confirmed that intentional removal of a condom during intercourse, where the complainant had consented only to protected sex, is conduct outside the scope of consent under s.74; consent is to a particular act, not to sex in general.
Holding. Consent under s.74 is consent to the specific act; conduct that goes beyond the scope of that consent is non-consensual.