16 judgments interpreting, applying, or limiting the provisions of this Act. Sorted by court tier then reverse-chronologically.
Supermarket shop workers can compare their pay with warehouse workers at different sites, even though the two groups never work together. They only need to show the warehouse staff would have broadly similar terms if they worked at the shop.
For s.66 equal-pay claims based on cross-establishment comparators, the 'common terms' requirement under s.79(4) EA 2010 (and the analogous ERA framework) requires only that broadly common terms would have been applied to the comparator group if employed at the claimant's establishment.
Holding. Common-terms test for cross-establishment comparators is purposive and hypothetical, not a strict identity-of-terms requirement.
Whether you are a 'worker' with rights like the minimum wage and holiday pay is not decided by what your contract calls you. Courts look at what the job is actually like — Uber drivers count as workers, not self-employed contractors.
Worker status under s.230(3)(b) is determined by reference to the purpose of the statutory protections and the substance of the relationship; written terms that misrepresent the reality of the working arrangement carry no weight where they conflict with the statutory aim.
Holding. Section 230 worker status is to be determined purposively from the reality of the relationship, not from written-contract labels.
If your manager dislikes you because you blew the whistle and tricks a more senior boss into firing you by inventing performance problems, that is still automatic unfair dismissal. The employer cannot hide behind an innocent decision-maker.
Where a manager hides the real (whistleblowing) reason for dismissal from the decision-maker, the dismissal is automatically unfair under s.103A; the reason for dismissal is attributed to the employer through the manager's knowledge.
Holding. Section 103A reaches dismissals where a manipulated decision-maker is unaware of the underlying whistleblowing reason.
Employers cannot dodge giving you worker rights by sticking a clause in your contract that lets you send a substitute. Unless you really can hand the job to anyone you like, you still count as a worker doing personal work.
A right of substitution operates to defeat worker status under s.230(3)(b) only if it is a genuine, broad and unfettered right; a limited substitution clause requiring the principal's consent does not displace personal-service character.
Holding. Conditional or limited substitution clauses do not defeat worker status; personal service remains the touchstone.
The Supreme Court refused to make the unfair dismissal test tougher on employers. Tribunals must still ask only whether the sacking fell within what a reasonable employer might do, not whether they would have done the same.
The band-of-reasonable-responses test continues to govern the s.98 fairness inquiry in misconduct cases; the Supreme Court rejected the invitation to depart from the test in favour of a more interventionist standard.
Holding. Section 98 fairness is and remains governed by the band-of-reasonable-responses test.
Even partners in a law firm or other LLP can count as workers if they personally do the work. That means professionals like solicitors can claim whistleblowing protection if their firm punishes them for raising concerns.
A limited liability partnership member can be a 'worker' within s.230(3)(b) where she undertakes to perform services personally; the LLP statutory framework does not displace ERA worker protections such as whistleblowing.
Holding. LLP members can qualify as workers under s.230; LLP status does not exclude ERA whistleblower protection.
If your contract says one thing but the job works completely differently in practice, courts can ignore the paperwork. Employers cannot use take-it-or-leave-it contracts to strip workers of rights they would otherwise have.
Courts may disregard written terms in employment contracts that do not reflect the true agreement; the unequal bargaining power between employer and worker justifies a purposive approach to identifying the actual rights and obligations.
Holding. Sham clauses in employment contracts may be disregarded; the question is what was actually agreed in substance.
If you work in Britain you usually get unfair dismissal rights, even if your employer is based abroad. For people working overseas, it depends on how strong your ties to British employment are — there is no rigid geographic rule.
Following the repeal of the old s.196 territorial restriction, the territorial reach of unfair-dismissal protection turns on the strength of the employee's connection with Great Britain and British employment law; ordinarily, working in GB at the time of dismissal will suffice.
Holding. Territorial reach of unfair-dismissal protection rests on a connection-with-GB test; the old s.196 limit is replaced by a substantive territorial inquiry.
You are made redundant when your employer needs fewer people to do the work, regardless of what your contract says your role is. The question is simply why you were let go — was it because there was less work to go round?
Redundancy under s.139 is established where the dismissal is wholly or mainly attributable to a diminution in the employer's requirement for employees to carry out work of a particular kind; the focus is on the cause of dismissal, not a contractual classification of work.
Holding. Section 139 redundancy turns on the cause-of-dismissal test: was the dismissal attributable to a diminution in work requirements?
Every job comes with a built-in promise of mutual trust between you and your employer. If your employer seriously breaks that trust — for example by running a corrupt business that damages your reputation — you can resign and claim constructive dismissal.
The implied term of mutual trust and confidence is part of every employment contract; a breach of that term (such as conducting business dishonestly) can amount to a repudiatory breach supporting s.95(1)(c) constructive dismissal, and stigma damages may flow.
Holding. Breach of the implied term of trust and confidence is repudiatory and supports constructive dismissal under s.95(1)(c).
Employers cannot skip proper procedures like warnings or hearings just because they think the outcome would have been the same. The dismissal is still unfair — though compensation may be reduced if you would probably have been sacked anyway.
Procedural unfairness in dismissal cannot be cured by showing that the outcome would have been the same had a fair procedure been followed; the loss to be compensated may be reduced if dismissal was likely to occur anyway (the Polkey reduction).
Holding. Procedural fairness is required even where the substantive outcome would be unchanged; the remedy is calibrated by the Polkey reduction rather than excused.
To get whistleblower protection, you need to give actual facts about what is going wrong, not just vague accusations. Saying 'management is corrupt' is not enough — you need to point to specific things that happened.
A protected disclosure under s.43B must contain or convey 'information' tending to show wrongdoing — an allegation alone is insufficient; the disclosure must have a sufficient factual content and specificity to be capable of qualifying.
Holding. Section 43B disclosures must convey 'information' (facts), not bare allegations or opinions.
You can still be a protected whistleblower even if you are partly motivated by your own grievance. As long as you reasonably believe what you are reporting also matters to the wider public, your complaint counts.
A 'qualifying disclosure' under s.43B requires the worker to reasonably believe both that there is wrongdoing and that disclosure is in the public interest; the public-interest test is a low threshold and a personal grievance with a wider public dimension can qualify.
Holding. Section 43B's public-interest test is a low fact-sensitive threshold; mixed personal/public motivations can still qualify a disclosure.
If your employer treats you so badly that any reasonable person would quit, you can leave and still claim you were dismissed. The bar is high — it has to be a serious breach of your contract, not just unreasonable behaviour.
Constructive dismissal under s.95(1)(c) requires the employer to have committed a repudiatory breach of contract entitling the employee to terminate; the test is contractual, not based on a general 'reasonableness' standard.
Holding. Section 95(1)(c) constructive dismissal is governed by ordinary contractual repudiation principles.
A tribunal will not ask whether it would have sacked you in the same situation. It only asks whether your employer's decision falls within the range of responses a reasonable employer might choose — which gives employers a lot of room.
The s.98(4) reasonableness inquiry asks whether dismissal fell within the band of reasonable responses open to a reasonable employer; the tribunal must not substitute its own view of what it would have done.
Holding. Fairness under s.98(4) is judged by the band-of-reasonable-responses standard; tribunals cannot substitute their own view.
If you are sacked for misconduct, your employer must genuinely believe you did it, have reasonable grounds for that belief, and have investigated properly. They do not need proof beyond reasonable doubt, just a fair process.
In conduct dismissals under s.98, the employer must (i) genuinely believe in the misconduct, (ii) have reasonable grounds for that belief, and (iii) have carried out as much investigation as is reasonable in the circumstances; the band-of-reasonable-responses test then applies to the dismissal.
Holding. Burchell's three-stage test governs the s.98 fairness of conduct dismissals.