12 judgments interpreting, applying, or limiting the provisions of this Act. Sorted by court tier then reverse-chronologically.
When there are no secure beds available, the High Court can authorise other placements that severely restrict a vulnerable child's freedom — for example, locking doors or constant supervision — to keep them safe from serious harm to themselves.
Section 25 (secure accommodation) and the inherent jurisdiction can together authorise placement that amounts to deprivation of liberty under Article 5 ECHR where statutory secure-accommodation criteria cannot be met; the Court of Appeal's reading was upheld.
Holding. Inherent jurisdiction can supplement s.25 to authorise Article 5 deprivation of liberty where secure-accommodation criteria do not apply.
If a council asks you to let them take your child into voluntary care, your agreement only counts if it is genuine. Social workers cannot scare you into signing by threatening immediate court action, and you can change your mind.
Section 20 voluntary accommodation requires consent that is real, informed and continuing; a parent's apparent acquiescence procured by a misleading impression of duress (e.g. that refusing would trigger immediate care proceedings) is not valid consent.
Holding. Section 20 accommodation requires real, informed and continuing parental consent; coercive or misleading procurement vitiates it.
Permanently separating a child from their birth family through adoption is a last resort. The court has to be satisfied that nothing else will work — not just that adoption seems like the best option.
Section 1 welfare in adoption cases requires that 'nothing else will do' — a stringent proportionality standard when permanent severance of birth ties is contemplated; the welfare paramountcy operates within an Article 8 ECHR proportionality framework.
Holding. Section 1 welfare in adoption requires 'nothing else will do' as the proportionality standard for terminating birth ties.
Councils cannot remove children from a family just because something bad might happen. The risk of future harm has to be backed by facts that are actually proved, not by suspicions, rumour, or worries about other children in the family.
Section 31(2) threshold based on 'likelihood of significant harm' requires more than a mere possibility — there must be a real possibility (a sufficient evidential basis); the threshold cannot be founded on findings of fact about another child or on suspicions falling short of proof.
Holding. Section 31 'likelihood' requires a real possibility supported by proven facts; the threshold cannot rest on unproved suspicion.
If you are a homeless 16 or 17-year-old, the council's children's services team must look after you, not just refer you to the housing department. You become a 'looked-after child' with the support and rights that go with it.
When a homeless 16- or 17-year-old presents to a local authority, the authority's duty under s.20 / s.22 must be evaluated as a children's-services duty rather than being routed to housing provision; the corporate-parent framework engages s.22 throughout.
Holding. Section 22 duties to looked-after children control over generic housing provision in homeless-child cases.
Each child's situation must be weighed on its own facts. There is no automatic rule that a child belongs with a biological parent — the judge looks at what is actually best for this child, not who shares their DNA.
Section 1's welfare-paramountcy principle requires the child's welfare to be assessed individually; the natural-parent presumption is not a separate guiding principle and cannot supplant the welfare checklist analysis.
Holding. Section 1 welfare assessment is individualised; no presumption in favour of natural parenthood.
Before a council can take a child into care, the court must be satisfied harm was more likely than not. If a child was clearly hurt but it is unclear which adult did it, the court can still act based on the group of possible suspects.
Threshold under s.31(2) must be proved on the balance of probabilities applied to past events; in cases of identified harm but uncertain perpetrator, the court should identify a pool of possible perpetrators and proceed to welfare on that footing.
Holding. Section 31 threshold is on balance of probabilities; pool of perpetrators is permissible where individual responsibility cannot be established.
When parents or carers ask the court to decide who a child lives with or spends time with, the child's welfare is what matters. A biological parent does not get to the front of the queue just because of genetics.
Section 8 residence orders (now child arrangements orders) require welfare-paramountcy analysis under s.1; the court rejected a presumption that biological parenthood automatically prevails over psychological or social parenthood.
Holding. Section 8 child arrangements determinations rest on s.1 welfare without biological-parent priority.
The council's general duty to support children in need is about planning services overall — it does not give any individual family an automatic right to demand a specific service. Parents cannot usually sue to force the council to provide something.
Schedule 2 paragraph 1 (general duties to children in need) confers target duties on local authorities rather than enforceable individual rights; the duty is to facilitate the children's-services framework, not to provide every available service to every child in need.
Holding. Schedule 2 paragraph 1 imposes a strategic 'target duty' on local authorities, not enforceable individual entitlements.
To take a child into care because of feared future harm, social workers must prove the underlying facts on the balance of probabilities. Strong suspicions of past abuse that cannot actually be proved are not enough to justify removal.
Section 31(2)'s likelihood-of-harm limb requires past facts to be proved on the balance of probabilities; suspicion or unproved allegation is not enough — the court cannot find a 'likelihood' founded on unproved facts.
Holding. Section 31 likelihood requires proven primary facts; suspicion alone cannot ground the threshold.
While care proceedings are ongoing, the court can order a residential assessment where parents and child stay together at a unit being observed by professionals. This gives families a real chance to show they can parent safely before any final decision.
Section 38(6) directs that the court may direct medical, psychiatric or other assessment of the child during an interim care order; this power is to be construed broadly enough to include residential assessment of parents alongside the child where reasonably required to inform the threshold and welfare inquiry.
Holding. Section 38(6) authorises broad assessments under interim care orders, including residential parent-child assessment to inform the welfare decision.
Courts can ban a parent from bringing more applications about their child without permission, but only with good reason and for a limited time. This is a serious restriction on access to the courts and is not used routinely to stop persistent parents.
Section 91(14) restrictions on further applications without permission require strong justification and should be limited in duration; they are a serious interference with the right of access to the courts and must be proportionate to identified harm.
Holding. Section 91(14) orders must be specifically justified, proportionate and time-limited; they are not to be made as routine case-management.