14 judgments interpreting, applying, or limiting the provisions of this Act. Sorted by court tier then reverse-chronologically.
A court can freeze someone's assets to protect a future foreign judgment, even if there is no separate lawsuit against them here. The power exists to stop people moving money out of reach, full stop.
The jurisdiction analogous to s.37 to grant freezing orders is not parasitic on a cause of action against the respondent in the same jurisdiction; the court may grant a freezing injunction to protect a prospective foreign judgment debt, provided there is a sufficient connection.
Holding. Freezing-injunction jurisdiction is autonomous: a substantive cause of action against the freezing respondent is not required where the order supports enforcement of a foreign judgment.
Parliament cannot quietly shut the courts out of reviewing a tribunal's legal errors. If it really wants to do that, it has to say so in the bluntest possible language — vague wording will not be enough.
Ouster clauses purporting to exclude the s.31 supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court must be construed strictly; even apparently absolute ouster language does not bar review for errors of law going to jurisdiction.
Holding. Section 31 review of jurisdictional errors of law survives even apparent ouster clauses absent the clearest statutory wording.
Courts can strike down government fees that price ordinary people out of going to a tribunal. Access to justice is a real right, not just a slogan.
Section 31 protects the constitutional right of access to the courts; tribunal-fees orders made under statutory power are unlawful if they have a real risk of preventing or deterring access to justice and so frustrate the legislative purpose.
Holding. The s.31 supervisory jurisdiction enforces a common-law constitutional right of access to courts; tribunal fees that impede that right are unlawful.
If the Upper Tribunal refuses you permission to appeal, you can only ask the High Court to step in when your case raises an important point of principle or there is some other compelling reason. Routine disagreements will not get through.
Judicial review of Upper Tribunal refusals of permission to appeal is available under s.31 only where the second-tier appeals test is satisfied (important point of principle or compelling reason); the supervisory jurisdiction is not ousted but is calibrated to respect the Tribunal's expertise.
Holding. JR of UT permission refusals proceeds under s.31 only on a calibrated second-tier-appeals threshold.
When the government holds onto your money it should not have taken, the court can make it pay you back with compound interest — not just the basic simple interest the Act mentions. That reflects the real value of being kept out of your money.
Section 35A's discretion to award simple interest is supplemented by the equitable jurisdiction to award compound interest as restitution for use of money; compound interest may form part of the restitutionary award where claims arise in unjust enrichment for premature tax payments.
Holding. Compound interest may be awarded as restitution alongside or in lieu of s.35A simple interest.
If you bankrolled and ran someone else's lawsuit for your own gain, you can be on the hook for the costs when it loses. You do not get to enjoy the upside of a case while ducking the downside.
Non-party costs orders under s.51 are appropriate where the non-party funded and controlled the litigation for its own benefit; the Privy Council distilled the principles into a flexible factor-based test focusing on benefit and control.
Holding. Non-party costs under s.51 are typically appropriate where the non-party both funded and controlled the litigation for its own commercial benefit.
If you knowingly publish something that wrecks the point of a court order against someone else, you can be punished for contempt. You do not need to have seen the exact wording of the order to be caught.
Contempt of court under the s.45 inherent jurisdiction does not require the third-party publisher to know of the specific terms of an injunction binding another party; knowing publication that frustrates the purpose of an interim injunction is sufficient for criminal contempt.
Holding. Third-party contempt requires knowing frustration of the purpose of an injunction, not knowledge of its detailed terms.
A court can order someone to pay the legal costs of a case even if they were not formally a party to it. The power is wide, though judges use it carefully.
Section 51 confers a broad discretion to award costs against any person, including non-parties to the litigation; the discretion is to be exercised cautiously but is not confined to the named parties.
Holding. Section 51 supports costs orders against non-parties as part of the court's broad costs discretion.
If you want to challenge a public body's decision, you generally have to use judicial review with its strict time limits and safeguards. You cannot dodge those rules by dressing the claim up as an ordinary lawsuit.
Section 31 made judicial review the exclusive procedure for challenging the legality of public-law decisions; abuse-of-process principles bar a litigant from pursuing public-law issues by ordinary action in order to circumvent the JR procedural safeguards.
Holding. Public-law challenges must in principle be brought by judicial review under s.31; collateral ordinary-action challenges are an abuse of process.
Judges decide whether you have enough of a stake to bring a judicial review by looking at the merits together with your interest. There is no quick gatekeeping test that throws out cases at the door.
Sufficient interest under s.31(3) is to be considered together with the merits and legal/factual context; standing is not a pure preliminary issue but a substantive consideration of whether the claimant has a real interest in the unlawful act sought to be impugned.
Holding. Standing under s.31(3) is a substantive merits-blended test, not a hurdle to be cleared in advance.
If a tribunal gets the law wrong in a way that touches its own power to decide, the decision counts as no decision at all. The courts can review it even when Parliament has tried to block them.
Errors of law going to the jurisdiction of a tribunal are reviewable under what is now s.31 notwithstanding an apparent ouster clause; the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors of law has largely been collapsed for review purposes.
Holding. An error of law going to jurisdiction renders the decision a nullity reviewable under the supervisory jurisdiction.
Before a court bans someone from bringing further claims without permission, there must be clear evidence they have been suing again and again without good reason. Cutting off access to the courts is a serious step.
A civil-restraint order under s.42 requires habitual and persistent issuing of litigation without reasonable ground; the court applied a high threshold and noted that vexatious-litigant restrictions are a serious curtailment of access to justice requiring clear proof.
Holding. Section 42 vexatious-litigant orders demand clear proof of persistent abuse; the test is exacting given the access-to-justice consequences.
Even private bodies can be taken to court for judicial review if they act like a regulator. What matters is what they actually do, not whether a statute set them up.
The s.29 supervisory jurisdiction extends to private or self-regulatory bodies exercising governmental functions; the Court of Appeal applied judicial review to the Takeover Panel on the basis of its de facto regulatory monopoly, not its formal source of power.
Holding. Section 29 supervisory jurisdiction is engaged by the de facto governmental function of the body, not only by formal statutory source.
In a libel case you will normally be tried by a judge alone, not a jury. You only get a jury if there is something genuinely unusual about your case that justifies it.
Section 69 (as preserved and as overlaid by Defamation Act 2013 s.11) makes jury trial in defamation cases the exception; the court will only order jury trial where exceptional reasons justify departing from the modern default of judge-alone trial.
Holding. Section 69 jury-trial discretion in defamation cases is exercised against jury trial save where exceptional grounds are shown.