6 judgments interpreting, applying, or limiting the provisions of this Act. Sorted by court tier then reverse-chronologically.
Even the worst killers must have some genuine chance of having their case looked at again later. A sentence with no possibility of review at all amounts to inhuman treatment.
A whole-life order made under the regime that supplements the mandatory life sentence imposed under s.1(1) is compatible with Article 3 ECHR only if domestic law affords a clear prospect of review and possible release; an irreducible life sentence is incompatible with Article 3.
Deciding how long a murderer must actually spend behind bars is a job for a judge, not a politician. Letting the Home Secretary set the minimum term breached the right to a fair hearing.
Although s.1(1) requires a mandatory life sentence, fixing the minimum term to be served is a sentencing exercise that must be performed by an independent and impartial tribunal under Article 6 ECHR; the Home Secretary's role in setting the tariff was therefore declared incompatible with the Convention.
Automatically giving every murderer a life sentence does not by itself breach human rights. Because prisoners get a minimum term and then a risk review before release, the system is not unfairly harsh.
The mandatory life sentence for murder required by s.1(1) is not, of itself, incompatible with Articles 3 or 5 ECHR: because the sentence is administered through a tariff-plus-risk-review system rather than as forfeiture of liberty for life, it is neither arbitrary nor grossly disproportionate.
For the worst murders, a life sentence really can mean staying in prison until you die. The law allows whole-life detention with no release date when the crime is bad enough.
The mandatory life sentence required by s.1(1) is in principle capable of meaning detention for the whole of a prisoner's natural life: a whole-life tariff is consistent with the statutory concept of life imprisonment where the crime is sufficiently heinous.
A murderer serving a life sentence is entitled to know what the trial judge recommended as the minimum time behind bars, to put their own case in writing, and to be told why if the minister picks a longer figure.
When setting the tariff (penal element) for the mandatory life sentence required by s.1(1), the Home Secretary must act fairly: the prisoner is entitled to know the judicial recommendation, to make written representations, and to receive reasons if the Secretary of State departs from the judges' view.
Judges follow a tariff system to decide how long a murderer must serve. A whole-life order, meaning no chance of release, is reserved for truly exceptional cases and is not handed out routinely.
Reviewing the modern framework for minimum terms and whole-life orders that operates within the mandatory life sentence required by s.1(1), the Court of Appeal restated the Schedule 21 starting points and emphasised that a whole-life order remains an exceptional disposal reserved for cases of exceptional seriousness.